Neuroplasticity, the brain's capacity to be shaped in response to environmental experience, has been claimed to resemble a double-edged sword -potentiating growth and healing when individuals are exposed to normative, benign or therapeutic environments on the one hand, mediating mental disorder development in those exposed to adversity, on the other. However, questions about the scope and limits of neuroplasticity and, especially, its clinical significance, remain unanswered. More specifically, while evidence for its positive role in normative development and its role in rehabilitation following brain injury is well documented, uncertainty remains regarding its relevance to mental health and psychopathology. One fundamental question regarding this can be phrased thus:
Over and above its roles in shaping the brain's response to normative and therapeutic environments to promote positive adaptation, is neuroplasticity a sufficiently potent force that it can produce deep-seated and long-lasting brain abnormalities, sufficient to override the mix of powerful pre-disposing factors that promote normal development?
Often extrapolating from highly constrained laboratory studies of synaptic plasticity and pruning in animals, many of us in the field of human developmental neuroscience firmly believe that the answer to that question is yes -however, if challenged to justify our view we would probably struggle to find really compelling evidence from human studies to support our case.
The link between early adversity and mental health is, of course, well established -with the number, type and timing of risks being important factors. Recent calls to move from merely demonstrating such an association to isolating its underlying processes and exploiting them to develop new interventions have prompted a resurgence of interest in understanding how environmentally induced brain alterations might mediate adversity-mental disorder pathways (Zeanah & Sonuga-Barke, 2016) . The Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry has played an important role in these recent developments. In particular, in 2016, we published both a seminal review of the relations between brain structure and different forms of child maltreatment (Teicher & Samson, 2016 ) and a special issue on the impact of early deprivation and trauma on development (Zeanah & Sonuga-Barke, 2016) . These contributions have moved the field forward by, in their own ways, making the case, within the methodological limitations imposed by ethical consideration inherent in studies of human maltreatment, that early adversity impacts neurocognitive development which in turn creates mental health risks.
The review of the literature linking child maltreatment and brain function produced by McCrory, Mattia, and Viding (2017; this issue) complements these prior works brilliantly. Focusing on neurocognitive processes in four domains -threat processing, reward processing, emotion regulation and executive control -the authors skilfully piece together what remains a frustratingly fragmented and methodologically constrained, albeit growing, literature. The authors elegantly organise the review around their recent hypothesis about the ways adversity shapes brain development to predict later mental disorder (McCrory & Viding, 2015) . This model is based on three main ideas. First, that 'maltreatment leads to neurocognitive alterations that embed latent vulnerability'. Second, that under stressful circumstances this vulnerability can become manifest as disorder. Third, 'such [neurocognitive] changes are often beneficial within the early maladaptive context (i.e. carry adaptive value within that particular setting) thus representing in part a functional response'.
As is so often the case in any scientific field, the development of this new hypothesis involved the adoption, extension and creative integration of already existing ideas and concepts to bring us a distinctive new perspective. The first idea of latent vulnerability reflected in neurocognitive alterations, echoes a parallel discussion relating to the way latent genetic vulnerability can be marked by neurocognitive deficits. It shares a considerable amount with the concept of endo-or intermediate phenotype -which as part of its definition is presumed to mark vulnerability in clinically unaffected family members who share a degree of genetic risk with the proband. In as much as the focus is on primarily environmentally, rather than genetically, driven intermediate phenotypes the current model constitutes an important reminder that the concept of intermediate phenotypes is not limited to genetic models. Nevertheless, the centrality of the role played by latent vulnerability in the development of disorder following adversity remains to be clarified. First, as many foster and adoptive parents will confirm, there is often absolutely nothing latent about the vulnerability of children previously exposed to maltreatment -with many presenting marked and persistent difficulties during childhood from the time they join their families. Second, the relationship between underlying neuropsychological impairment and manifest disorder is a complex one, even in the absence of risk exposures. A substantial proportion of individuals with disorder do not display underlying neurocognitive deficits while many individuals free of disorder do (Nigg, Doyle, Willcutt, & Sonuga-Barke, 2005) . There is very little evidence to suggest that such disorder-free neuropsychological impairment will eventually manifest as disorder in either deprived or nondeprived samples.
The second idea is a variant of the classical stressdiathesis model in which underlying vulnerabilities usually, thought of in terms of genetic risk, are only activated to produce disorder following exposure to stress -perhaps especially during periods of development where stress is greatest -that is, important life transitions. Consistent with this prediction, we recently demonstrated both an exacerbation of longstanding risk for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and a de-novo onset of emotional problems following the transition from adolescence to adulthood for individuals exposed to extreme deprivation early in life who had then been adopted (Kennedy et al., 2016; Sonuga-Barke et al., 2017) . It is unclear whether these findings are related to stress in young adult lives or to the reduction in active support from families likely to occur around that time. The third idea that maltreatment effects on brain development are the result of adaptation to the prior adverse environment draw heavily on concepts discussed by Rutter and O'Connor in their seminal paper on biological programming in psychological development (2004) . In their paper, these authors draw a distinction between a number of different mechanisms through which adversity can shape brain development to the detriment of the exposed individuals. The first is experience-adaptive programming -which is akin to the hypothesised mechanism outlined in the current paper and shares some elements with the Developmental Origin of Diseases Hypothesis of the 'thrift phenotype' -the organism adapts to the developmental context on the assumption that current and future environments will share key features. The second, is experience-expectant programming -where the lack of essential experiences during sensitive periods interrupts development (see McLaughlin, Sheridan, & Nelson, 2017 for a recent formulation). The third involves deprivationrelated neural damage brought about toxic exposures, for instance, to extreme stress (Bremner, 1999) . Experimental research with animal models demonstrates that each of these is a viable explanation of adversity-induced effects in humans. However, it is important to add that the two programming models depend for their value as explanations of long-term effects on brain structure and function on their being a sensitive window during development when early effects are fixed and persist into the future. Such a concept is implicit in the experienceexpectant model but not in the experience-adaptive model. In these models, it is difficult to see why an organism that adapts to one set of, albeit abnormal circumstances, during adverse exposures, cannot over time readapt when introduced into an enriched environment. In reality, given the complex and heterogeneous nature of adversity and its effects, it is likely that all of these different mechanisms are implicated in one way or another to explain the mix of short and long terms effects of maltreatment.
We are a considerable way off from achieving a complete understanding of the role of neuroplasticity in long-term mental health -this important paper has brought us one-step closer to achieving that goal.
